Chapter 3: The Philippines, Sulu, and the War of Lawfare

“When bullets cannot penetrate, they send lawyers. When armies cannot advance, they use treaties.”

In today’s world, colonisation no longer occurs solely through bombs and tanks. It now manifests in a more subtle form — through international courts, complex contracts, and signatures with long-term consequences. Sabah, a state on the edge of Borneo, has become a major battleground in this modern strategy.

The Origins of the Sabah Lease: The 1878 Agreement

The dispute over Sabah stems from an agreement signed on 22 January 1878 between the Sultan of Sulu and the British North Borneo Company (BNBC). The agreement granted BNBC the right to manage, use, and administer areas in North Borneo, in exchange for annual payments. However, the interpretation of this agreement has remained a subject of intense debate for over a century.

There are two main versions of the agreement:

• The English version uses the term “grant and cede”, which implies full and permanent cession.

• The Sulu/Spanish version uses terms translated as “lease”, which implies rental, not full surrender.

This difference became the core argument of the Sulu Sultanate’s claim — that Sabah was leased, not ceded. But from a historical and legal perspective, the reality was more complex.

BNBC governed Sabah independently for decades, creating legal and administrative systems without interference from the Sulu side. When BNBC handed over Sabah to the British Crown in 1946, all prior agreements were effectively superseded. Sovereignty had shifted from a private company to a sovereign state.

Therefore, while the 1878 agreement remains historically significant, it no longer serves as a valid legal basis for modern sovereignty claims — especially after Sabah’s entry into Malaysia through a lawful and internationally recognised process in 1963.

From BNBC to British Crown (1946)

After World War II, BNBC could no longer manage its territories. Much of North Borneo was devastated by war, and private companies were no longer suited to administer colonies. As a result, BNBC formally ceded the territory to the British Crown on 15 July 1946.

Sabah then became the Crown Colony of North Borneo, officially governed by the British government. This marked the end of corporate rule and the beginning of formal colonial administration.

From the standpoint of international law:

• Full authority over Sabah had passed from a private company to a recognised sovereign state.

• Any historical contracts were replaced by formal state governance.

• The Sulu Sultanate no longer had any legal or administrative ties to Sabah.

This became the foundation for Sabah’s integration into Malaysia in 1963 — no longer a disputed region, but one that had legally transitioned through recognised stages of sovereignty.

Sabah’s Entry into Malaysia (1963)

On 16 September 1963, Sabah joined the newly formed Federation of Malaysia through a lawful and internationally acknowledged process.

The process began with the Cobbold Commission (1962), an independent body that surveyed public opinion in Sabah and Sarawak. The findings confirmed that the majority of Sabahans supported joining Malaysia, provided their rights were protected.

This led to the signing of the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), involving representatives from Malaya, Britain, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. The agreement confirmed that Sabah joined Malaysia based on mutual consent — not coercion or colonisation.

The United Nations sent observers and confirmed that the process complied with the principle of self-determination, as outlined in the UN Charter.

Following this, Malaysia inherited the obligation to continue the annual payment of RM5,300 to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu. However, this was a gesture of goodwill, not an acknowledgment of sovereignty. It reflected continuity of past agreements, not recognition of ownership.

The payment continued until 2013, when it was suspended after the Lahad Datu armed incursion by a group claiming ties to the Sulu Sultanate. This attack exposed how the goodwill payment had been misused for political and military purposes.

Since then, Malaysia has taken a firm stance: all claims over Sabah are baseless and threaten national sovereignty.

International Tribunal and Lawfare (2022–2023)

In 2022, heirs of the Sultan of Sulu launched a case against Malaysia through an arbitration tribunal in Spain, demanding nearly USD15 billion — a sum exceeding half of Malaysia’s annual development budget.

The proceedings were initiated without Malaysia’s consent and were kept hidden. The biased ruling, known as the “Final Award,” shocked Malaysia.

Further investigations revealed:

• The tribunal had no legal jurisdiction. Malaysia had not agreed to arbitration — a basic requirement.

• The arbitrator, Dr. Gonzalo Stampa, ignored orders from the Madrid High Court to stop the case. In 2023, he was found guilty of contempt of court, sentenced to six months in prison, and suspended as an arbitrator for a year.

• Courts in Paris and other European countries rejected enforcement of the Final Award, blocking efforts to seize Malaysian assets abroad.

The key question remains: who orchestrated this? Who funded, planned, and legally supported such a complex operation?

Geopolitical clues point to involvement from the Philippine government, which has never renounced its claim on Sabah. More broadly, the case aligns with the strategic interests of the United States, which seeks influence in Southeast Asia.

This was not a legal dispute — it was a calculated act of proxy lawfare, where legal channels are weaponised to undermine national sovereignty.

The Philippines, America, and the Strategy of Revival

The Philippines has never officially abandoned its claim on Sabah. The issue still appears in some of its official documents and political rhetoric. When faced with internal pressure, Filipino politicians often revive this narrative to gain support.

Behind the Philippines stands the United States — a global power with deep military presence in the region. It maintains military bases in the Philippines through formal defence agreements.

However, under Philippine law, these bases cannot be used for offensive operations against other nations without special permission. This limits U.S. action in the region.

This is where Sabah becomes strategically attractive. It is close, resource-rich, and free from restrictive domestic laws. If the Philippines can secure legal recognition over Sabah, even symbolically, then the U.S. and its allies can justify military, economic, and diplomatic entry into the region.

They do not need to invade — they only need a ruling that makes their presence legal.

This is the new face of colonisation. It doesn’t come with warships, but with:

• Tribunals that appear legitimate

• Investment deals that seem beneficial

• Aid that looks humanitarian

• Diplomacy that sounds friendly

But behind all of it lies the goal: to re-establish control over Sabah, and use it as a gateway for influence in Southeast Asia amid the U.S.–China rivalry.

Law as a New Weapon

This is modern warfare. It no longer begins with bombs. It begins with documents, resolutions, and institutions. It creeps in through trade, development funds, and legal rulings.

Ordinary people don’t see it. Mainstream media often stays quiet. But inch by inch, land that once clearly belonged to us is being pulled away.

We’ve seen this script before:

• Iraq: invaded on false claims of weapons of mass destruction. No weapons found, but the country was ruined and its oil exploited.

• Libya: overthrown in the name of democracy. Now caught in endless civil war.

• Afghanistan: occupied for 20 years, then abandoned in chaos.

• Syria: broken through proxy wars, propaganda, and sanctions.

This is the playbook of modern empire — no tanks, just treaties.

And now, the same playbook is being used in Sabah.

Sabah may never see a direct war, but it is already under legal, diplomatic, and economic attack. If we fail to recognise this now, we will witness another fall of Muslim lands — not by force, but by slow, silent surrender.

Chapter 3 Conclusion: When We Are Silent, They Advance

Malaysia’s victory in court is just one page in a long battle. The enemy is not done. If one strategy fails, they will try another — new claims, new tribunals, more cunning tactics.

To them, Sabah is not just territory. It is power, routes, and influence.

The real danger is not foreign armies. It is our own ignorance — of history, of tactics, of what we are losing. We are not losing because we are weak. We are losing because we do not realise we are already at war.

Throughout history, Muslim lands were not only lost in war. Some were betrayed. Others were signed away. And many were lost because people didn’t know they were being taken.

“Let us not lose Sabah — not because we were defeated in battle, but because we failed to read the schemes hidden in documents and signatures.”